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Abstract
The decline of capital taxation is associated with e￿ciency gains.
We show that, when agents are heterogeneous, equity concerns can
change the policy recommendation driven by e￿ciency. Given the
empirical evidence on the roots of heterogeneity inside each country,
either in developing or developed economies, the elimination of capital
taxation would lead always to a decline in inequality and to an increase
of welfare of the poorest, in a small open economy acting unilaterally.
On the contrary for a group of open economies following the same
policy, the opposite occurs: with the elimination of capital taxation
inequality worsens and it hurts the poorest of each country. Therefore
globalization can be important to support a positive tax on capital.
Keywords: Capital taxation; Incidence; Globalization of capital
markets; Policy coordination;
JEL: D63; E62; F42;
1 Introduction
That a decline of the tax rate on capital income in the steady state has a
positive e￿ect in the e￿ciency of the economy is a well known result since
the work of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). However that second best
solution of not taxing capital has not been taken seriously by policy makers.
One reason invoked, among others, is the regressive characteristic of the
elimination of the tax on capital income, when accompanied by the increase of
the tax rate on labor income, if the same pattern of government expenditures
1has to be ￿nanced. In short, either from a positive point of view, or from
a normative without additional redistribution instruments, transforms the
robust policy recommendation of eliminating the tax on capital into a weak
on, if that change of policy is accompanied by a decline of the welfare of the
poorest households in the economy. This assertion on the decrease of equity
is usually based on a partial equilibrium reasoning: the reduction of the tax
on capital and the increase of the tax on labor income increases the return
on capital and declines the return on labor and therefore bene￿ts the upper
income agents and worsens-o￿ the situation of the lower income agents.
This article shows, using a general equilibrium framework, that the e￿ect
on equity caused by the elimination of the tax on capital depends mainly on
the joint distribution of characteristics that determine the society’ hetero-
geneity and on the degree of e￿ective international mobility of capital, for
the economy under study. In the case of a small open economy, with perfect
capital mobility, that decides unilaterally to change policy, the positive e￿ect
on e￿ciency of the elimination of the tax on capital income is maximized and
it is shown that the e￿ect on equity is always positive for the existing empiri-
cal evidence on heterogeneity. However in an economy where the elimination
of capital taxation leads to a transitional period, either because the economy
is closed to capital movements, or because the change in policy has a small
e￿ect on capital in￿ows, it is no longer in general guaranteed that the elimi-
nation of the capital taxation is equity improving. On the contrary we show
that here, for the empirical relevant heterogeneity, the decline in equity given
the policy change is the rule. Besides, as claimed in Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1994) in this case the increase in e￿ciency of applying the second
best solution of capital taxation is mainly driven from the high tax rates
in the initial periods. This implies that, the simple elimination of capital
taxation has a smaller e￿ect on e￿ciency, and can even being negative for
special parametrization. Both the low e￿ect on e￿ciency and the negative
e￿ect on equity lead in this case to a loss to the poorest of the economy.
Therefore, if some equity concerns or political economy ingredients are
included in the analysis, the desirability to decline or even to eliminate capital
taxation depends crucially on the e￿ective mobility of capital, given the
change of policy.
We consider an economy with in￿nitely lived households1. The house-
1Since accounting for the distribution of wealth is fundamental to assessing the con-
2holds in our model economy di￿er in initial wealth and in labor e￿ciency.
Since we assume those distributions to be exogenous, we can replicate ex-
actly the particular moments of the wealth- and earnings-distributions that
are crucial to assessing the e￿ects of the tax reform.2
The exogenous distributions of initial wealth and labor e￿ciency, as well
as the conditions for Gorman aggregation, i.e. that there is a representa-
tive agent, considerably simplify the computation of the aggregate general
equilibrium e￿ects. These assumptions allow us to perform the exercise with-
out a full characterization of the joint distribution of wealth and earnings.
The exercise can be developed using only a subset of the moments of those
distributions. To measure the e￿ects of the reform, we compare welfare dis-
tributions before and after the reform. The method used is the one developed
in Correia (1999) to analyze distributional e￿ects on models with heteroge-
neous households, and applied in Correia (2010) to study the e￿ect on equity
of the introduction of consumption taxation.
Our exercise is quite di￿erent from the one developed in Judd (1985).
That work assumes the existence of idiosyncratic taxes. On the contrary in
the present work we want exactly to analyze a world where the government
does not have enough information to use those household speci￿c taxes. We
do not determine the optimal plan but we limit our analysis to the e￿ect
on equity of a policy measure that is e￿cient. There are two articles in
the literature near ours. One is the well known result of Harberger (1995),
where it is shown that wages decline due to an increase of the tax of capital
in a general equilibrium model of a small open economy. This is a di￿erent
exercise from ours since it assumes that the change in tax revenue distributed
lump sum, and the tax on labor is maintained. The second article is the one
by Garcia-Mil￿ a, Marcet and Ventura (2010). There a closed economy model
of heterogeneous agents is developed, with preferences such that there is no
representative agent. They ￿nd that the poor agents are worse o￿ after the
sequences of this tax reform, typical overlapping-generation models cannot replicate our
results. For an explanation see, e.g., Ana Casta~ neda, Javier Diaz-Gim￿ enez, and Jose-Vitor
Rios-Rull, (2003).
2In the model, households belong to the same group if they share the same earn-
ings/wealth ratio, and are thus a￿ected in a similar way by the tax reform. Other studies,
such as Per Krusell and Jose-Vitor Rios-Rull (1996), use similar partitions of the popu-
lation. Taxes are used to ￿nance transfers, but transfers are endogenous, and part of a
political equilibrium.
3elimination of the tax on capital income, when total tax revenues are made
constant by the increase the tax on labor income. The results in our paper
clarify the apparent contradiction existent on the results of these two works.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 the model of the small open
economy is presented. In section 3 the exercise is described and the results are
derived for that economy. Section 4 extends the model to a closed economy
and discusses the importance for the results of having a real interest rate
endogenous to the change of policy. Section 5 contains the conclusions.
2 The model
The model represents a small open economy with perfect capital mobility.
The technology is characterized by a neoclassical production function using
as inputs capital, K; and labor measured in units of e￿ciency, EN; where N
represents hours of work and E is an index of labor e￿ciency: The govern-
ment spends a constant ￿ow of per capita expenditures, G; and taxes labor
and capital income, at the origin, at the tax rates ￿n and ￿k; respectively.
The assumption that the system of taxing capital income is the territorial
system implies that the income of external assets held by domestic house-
holds, B￿; is not subject to taxation. The real net return of these assets is
the net international real interest rate, r￿: This constant rate is the one that
characterizes the steady state of the rest of the world, which we assume to
have fundamentals identical to the small economy. These assumptions im-
ply that, with no costs of adjustment of capital, the economy will converge
immediately to the new steady state, following the change of policy.
Agents are heterogeneous in labor e￿ciency and in non-human wealth.
Each household i has a labor e￿ciency level measured by Ei and holds wealth
in physical capital, Ki; domestic bonds, Bi and external assets B￿
i : Agents
are identical in every other characteristic. To apply the method described in
Correia (1999) we assume that preferences are such that Gorman aggregation
is possible. Moreover, given cross section empirical evidence, we propose
the type of preferences used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu￿man (1988)
(GHH), which are characterized by a zero wealth e￿ect on labor decisions.
This characteristic implies that rich households do not work less than poor
households, when having the same labor e￿ciency.










; ￿ > 0;’ > 1 (1)
where Cit and Nit represent the consumption and hours of work of agent i in
period t:








(1 + ro)(1 + r￿)t + Ai0 (2)
where r0 is the net rate of return in period zero, wt is the net wage rate
at period t and Ai0; the initial wealth, is de￿ned as Ki0 + Bi0 + B￿
i0: It is







So it is clear that hours of work do not di￿er across agents when these have
the same level of e￿ciency. When richer agents have a higher level of labor
e￿ciency, they will work more than poor agents. Substituting this expression
in the utility function (1) and in equation (2) allows to rede￿ne the optimal




































3The qualitative result on equity is maintained with di￿erent preference representations.
5Note that preferences are homogeneous in b Cit ￿ Cit￿Cit: Given the isoelastic
preferences described in (4) and since the international real interest rate is
at the steady state level, r￿ = 1
￿ ￿ 1, then b Cit = b Ci; i.e., the transformed
consumption is constant over time. The intertemporal budget constraint,
given by equation (5), allows for the determination of the optimal level of
this variable for every household i as a function of the net wages path, the
international real interest rate, the interest rate at time zero and its level of


















+ (1 + r0)Ai0
3
5 (7)
The general equilibrium of this economy is characterized by equations (3)
and (7) for the representative agent, i = r; non-Ponzi game conditions for
the external debt, and the following equations:4,5
Yt = F(Kt;ErNrt) = Crt + G + Krt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Krt + B￿
rt+1 ￿ (1 + r￿)B￿
rt




















r0 = (1 ￿ ￿k0)(F10 ￿ ￿)
r￿ = (1 ￿ ￿kt)(F1t ￿ ￿); t ￿ 1
wt = (1 ￿ ￿n)F2t
The representative agent is the household with the weighted average la-
bor e￿ciency level of the economy6 and with the average stock of initial
4For simplicity we impose that the initial government debt is zero.
5We will represent the parcial derivative of function F(:) in order to the ith argument
as Fi:
6We choose units such that this average e￿ciency level is one.
6non-human wealth. Given preferences and technology, as well as the initial
average stock of physical capital and of external assets, and given policy in-
struments (G;￿n and ￿kt) the general equilibrium of this small open economy
can be computed. The e￿ciency of the economy is measured by the utility of
the representative agent given equilibrium prices. The linear homogeneous
utility of every agent can be easily computed substituting the equilibrium
price vector and the idiosyncratic labor e￿ciency and initial wealth in (7).
3 Elimination of the capital income tax
The objective of this article is to compare the welfare distribution of agents
in case 1, where the economy is characterized by a constant positive tax
rate on capital, with the alternative situation, case 2, where the economy is
characterized by that same tax in period zero but with a zero tax rate on
capital afterwards. In Correia (1996) we prove that case 1 is the second best
solution. Then, case 2 is always more e￿cient than case 1, i.e. the utility of
the representative agent is higher in 2 than in 1
To avoid problems of cardinality when comparing utility across expe-
riences and across agents we use the compensation consumption criteria,
i.e. the percentage change in transformed consumption, b C; that each agent
should experience to be as well o￿ in both situations. This is equivalent to
choose as utility indicator the de￿ned variable b Ci; that is the transformed
consumption of agent i:
The e￿ect on e￿ciency, or the e￿ect on utility of the representative agent,

















+ (1 + r0)Ar0
3
5 (8)































where x1and x2 represent respectively the equilibrium values of x in the
case 1 and 2.
7As the tax on capital income is constant in both experiments for t ￿ 1;
the non-arbitrage condition and the neoclassical production function implies
that Kr
N ; and therefore the marginal productivity of labor, is constant for
t ￿ 1: The constant labor income tax rate then leads to a constant net wage
for t ￿ 1 in every experiment.
For t = 0 and using f.o. c.









r0 = (1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿)K
￿
r0








Nr0 increases with the higher tax on labor. By assumption
￿1
k0 = ￿2
k0: Therefore we obtain:
Result 1: The elimination of the tax rate on capital income implies that
the net real interest rate in period 0 declines, i.e. r2
0 < r1
0.
Using (9) and result 1 we can say that:














(1 + r￿)t (10)
These two results explain that, for the representative agent, utility in-
creases not due to the return on capital, which declines, but due to the net
present value of human capital, which increases although being taxed at a
higher rate.
To understand the e￿ects on di￿erent agents, we order households by
increasing transformed consumption, or utility. If i > j; agent i is richer, that
8is it has a higher utility than agent j: Then to compare policy 1 with policy
2 in terms of equity we use the concept developed by Marshall and Olkin
(1979): the relative di￿erential dominance. 7 This concept is equivalent to
an ordering of distributions of transformed consumption across households
by the ￿rst order stochastic dominance criteria.
De￿nition: Policy 2 is equity improving in relation to policy 1 i￿ policy










; for i > j (11)
To determine the e￿ect on equity of the elimination of the tax on capital
income let us consider two extreme cases: One where agents have identical
non-human wealth, i.e. Aio = Aro; and where the heterogeneity comes just
from di￿erent labor e￿ciency levels. On the other extreme agents have iden-
tical labor e￿ciency levels, i.e. Ei = Er = 1; and are di￿erentiated only by
di￿erent initial levels of non-human wealth:
Note that, using the de￿nition of b Ci given in (7), in both extreme cases
the transformed consumption, and therefore utility, is the sum of two items:
one that is homogeneous across agents and a second one that di￿erentiates
agents.
Using (7), we check whether condition (11) is satis￿ed, after the results 1





















On the other side when heterogeneity is caused by di￿erent initial ￿nancial




















7We show in Correia (1999) that this criteria of comparisons includes the Lorenz crite-
ria. It is equivalent to the Lorenz criteria, or to a ￿rst-order stochastic dominance criteria,
for any sub-groups of the population.
9Therefore we can state that:
Result 3: The e￿ect on equity of the elimination of the tax on capital
depends crucially on the roots of heterogeneity: is equity worsening when
agents di￿er on labor e￿ciency and, on the contrary, is equity improving
when agents di￿er by the initial stock of ￿nancial wealth.
We can easily interpret result 3 in the following way: Individual welfare
depends on two items: the present value of a function of net wages, which
by result 2 increases with the elimination of capital taxation, and the initial
wealth of every agent evaluated at (1 + r0);which by result 1 declines with
the change of policy. In the extreme cases described in result 3, depending
on the characterization of households, either the ￿rst or the second parcel
is homogeneous across households. So, in the case where agents di￿er by
labor e￿ciency, the ￿rst parcel is heterogeneous across households and the
second is homogeneous . The opposite occurs when agents are di￿erentiated
exclusively by the initial stock of ￿nancial wealth.
Because the e￿ect of the elimination of capital taxation on equity depends
completely on the roots of households heterogeneity, the question proposed in
this section is an empirical one. Cross section data tells us that both wealth
and earnings are not equally distributed across households, and that either
of the two extreme characterizations above are not plausible empirically. If
both these two dimensions characterize the household, we can state that:




























Aj0 for all i and j such that b Cj < b Ci.

















8This is Proposition 2 in Correia (2010).






(1+r￿)t =(1 + r0)
We can write the percentage change of b Ci
b Cj































￿ 0, su￿cient conditions for this to
happen are d ￿(p)=￿ (p)
2








’￿1 for b Ci ￿ b Cj. .
Results 1 and 2 guarantee that a) is satis￿ed when capital taxation is
eliminated. Empirical evidence have to be used to verify whether condition
b) is satis￿ed.
From Budria et al. (2002) we use two di￿erent set of empirical obser-
vations. First, their comparison of the top 1% with the bottom 40% of the
distributions for wealth and earnings in the 1980’s for the U.S.. And second,





Ai0 for every quintile.10 From Table 1 the ratio between
the top 1% and the bottom 40% for wealth can be computed. It is 1,335,







A1;0 , where 1 and 40 are,
respectively, the top 1% and the bottom 40% groups of this two distributions.
The positive correlation between wealth and earnings would be su￿cient for
condition b) of proposition 1 to be satis￿ed for the two groups.
The information from the partition into quintiles is summarized in Figure
111where the average initial wealth level are displayed on the line (the ￿rst
quintile has zero wealth) and e￿ciency levels are measured by Ei
’
’￿1 since,
in the model, earnings across households are linear in Ei
’





Ai0 declines with the increase in wealth, although the two
characteristics are positively correlated.





10See Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix.
11For the ￿rst quintile I transformed the negative value of wealth into zero.
11Using those pieces of evidence and proposition 1, as well as the fact that
the proposed policy measure increases e￿ciency, it is immediate to conclude
that:
Result 4: Using empirical evidence every agent with a level of welfare
below the one of the representative agent is better o￿ with the elimination of
capital taxation.
As the representative agent is better o￿ and, for j < r,
b Cj
b Cr increases, the
utility of household j increases more than the utility of the representative
agent.
We prove that, using cross section data, the increase on human wealth
and the decline on non-human initial wealth is still equity improving. As the
representative agent increases welfare, then every agent with a level of wel-
fare lower than the average increases welfare with the elimination of capital
taxation in the small open economy.
How robust is this result to di￿erent periods and economies? The de-
scribed general characteristics of the U.S. distributions of earnings and wealth
did not change during the 1990’s, and they are common to a large set of Euro-
pean economies, as shown in Budria and Diaz-Gimenez (2007). When trying
to infer for developing countries like Latin America data is more scarce. Even
if inequalities in education, earnings and income have been extensively stud-
ied in Latin America, little is known about the distribution of wealth in this
region. However the study of Torche and Spilerman (2008), which focus on
the distribution of di￿erent assets types across some economic strata, allow
us to infer that condition b) of proposition 1 is even more clear in that region.
As claimed in that study: " In all countries for which wealth data is available,
the Gini index for household wealth exceeds the Gini for household income".
Using this evidence we can claim that this result is general for developed and
developing countries.
124 The importance of the exogenous real in-
terest rate
The environment of the small open economy described in section 2 is a partic-
ular one, in the sense that the real interest rate does not react to the change
of policy that is under study. This assumption would no more be true either
in the extreme case of a closed economy, or when the change of policy in one
country is followed by a signi￿cative number of other countries, or in interme-
diate cases where the country, although being the only one to implement the
policy change and being open to capital trade, is not small in the sense that
the elimination of capital taxation can a￿ect the equilibrium international
real interest rate. We say that in those cases the e￿ective capital mobility is
low because, given the change in policy, capital ￿ows are much smaller when
compared with the ones in the small open economy just described in section
2. In Garcia-Mil￿ a et al (2010), the elimination of capital taxation in a closed
economy leads to a decline in welfare of the poorest households of the econ-
omy. Their exercise is implemented in an environment which is not Gorman
amenable, since preferences are not quasi-homothetic. Therefore it is not
feasible the construction of a representative household and changes in the
distribution a￿ect equilibrium prices. For the validity of the method applied
in the present work it is important to understand whether the results ob-
tained for a small open economy would be maintained in a closed economy.
If this was the case then the e￿ects on equilibrium driven by distribution
would be ￿rst order e￿ects, and the method a bad approximation.
This section develops the same exercise of section 2 but now in a closed
economy. Here the change of policy will a￿ect also equilibrium real interest
rates, implies a transitional path to the new steady state, and the change
in equilibrium has to be computed numerically. When capital taxes are
eliminated the economy converges from the steady state path associated with
policy 1 to the one associated with policy 2. The equilibrium is characterized

















Notice that the only di￿erence from (2) is that the net real interest rate is no
13more constant and reacts to the change in policy. The resources constraint
is now given, for every t; by
Yt = F(Kt;ErNrt) = Crt + G + Krt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Krt
because B￿
it+1 = 0.
We use the calibration and part of the exercise performed in Correia
(2010). That is, ￿k = :512 and ￿n = :23; which are consistent with N = :25
and G=Y = :19: Preferences are such the ’ = 1:8; ￿ = 2:34; ￿ = 1:001
and ￿ = :96: The technology is Cobb Douglas, the share of capital is :4 and
depreciation is :1:
The following table summarizes the information necessary for the exercise:




￿k = :5;￿n = :23 5:6(1) 3:7
Elimination of capital taxation
￿k = 0;￿n = :35 5:8(1:02) 2:9
where vr(￿) is the welfare value of the representative utility(consumption










It is immediate to see that, contrary to what happen in the small open
economy, the value of ￿=￿ declines with the elimination of capital taxation13.
The transition to the new steady state is now characterized by an increasing
capital/ labor ratio, therefore by an increasing path of wages and a decreas-
ing path of interest rates. When compared with the case when there is no
transition, wages are always lower and interest rates always higher during
this transition path. Both contribute to a sign of ￿=￿ in the closed economy
di￿erent from the one in the small open economy.
Taking into account the described empirical evidence on the joint distri-
bution of earnings and wealth and using proposition 1, the decline in ￿=￿
leads to an increase in inequality.
Then the question is whether, given the increase in e￿ciency reported in
the ￿rst column of Table 1,the increase in inequality implies that the poorest
households are worse o￿ after the elimination of capital taxation.
Using the endowments of labor e￿ciency and initial capital for the repre-
sentative household and for the households in the ￿rst and second quintile,
the values of utility for the representative agent as well as the values of ￿=￿

















13This decline is robust to di￿erent preferences, For example the same e￿ect is obtained
with preferences isoelastic in consumption and leisure.
15to con￿rm that welfare of the ￿rst and second quintiles decline with the
policy. This result establish that the di￿erent result in Garcia-Mil￿ a et al
(2010) comes from the e￿ects of the change of policy on the real interest
rates, that occur in the closed economy.14
5 Conclusions
We show in this article that the e￿ect on equity of the elimination of the tax
rate on capital income depends in a crucial way on the globalization of capital
markets. Whether the elimination of capital taxation leads to a change in
the path of the real interest rate or to capital in￿ows into the country makes
the whole di￿erence for the result. The ￿rst case can occur either because
the economy is closed or because, being capital markets open internationally,
the change of policy was taken also by other countries. In the second case
capital markets are open but the economy acts unilaterally, and is small to
in￿uence the equilibrium real interest rate. Theoretically the e￿ect on equity
would also depend on the roots of heterogeneity across households, but for the
existing empirical evidence on the distribution of households characteristics
the result would be well de￿ned, for a given path of the real interest rate.
Given the empirical evidence on the joint distribution of characteristics
across households, which relevant moments are quite robust to most devel-
oped and developing countries, the elimination of capital taxation in a closed
economy, or for a group of small economies, worsens equity, while it improves
it in a small open economy. Besides, the e￿ect on e￿ciency is positive in both
cases, being stronger in the small open economy. Both e￿ects imply that the
decision to implement that policy leads to a decline in the welfare of the
poorest households in an economy where the change of policy does not lead
to e￿ective ￿ows of capital across countries. E￿ective mobility of capital
turns this result round. In that case the elimination of capital taxation leads
always to an improvement of the welfare of the poorest households, as is the
case in the small open economy.
14Also, as said, important for the method used in the present article, the elimination of
the e￿ects on equilibrium of the changing distribution are really second order e￿ects and
the hypothesis of a representative agent is a good one for the present exercise.
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18Table1￿Budria et al.￿2002￿￿
Table 2 ￿Table7 in Budria et al￿2002￿￿
. . . And Ranked by Wealth
Characteristics of Sample Households in Each Wealth Group
Household
Characteristics
Households in Wealth Quintiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Total Sample
Average Earnings 16.9 27.7 35.1 42.2 90.1 54.8
Average Wealth ￿4.1 19.0 72.6 175.3 1,177 288.0
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